Congo, Democratic Republic of the vs Libya: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index

Congo, Democratic Republic of the
1 0-10
in 2019
Libya
1 0-10
in 2019
Congo, Democratic Republic of the rank
157th
Libya rank
157th

Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time

  • Congo, Democratic Republic of the
  • Libya
11.522.53200520122019

How they compare

Congo, Democratic Republic of the currently reports 1 0-10 against 1 0-10 in Libya, a difference of 0 0-10.

The two have swapped places 1 time across 15 shared years of data; in 2005 it was Congo, Democratic Republic of the ahead.

Congo, Democratic Republic of the ranks 157th and Libya ranks 157th of 191 countries.

Congo, Democratic Republic of the has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.

Head to head by decade

Decade Congo, Democratic Republic of the Libya Difference Ahead
2000s 3 0-10 1 0-10 2 0-10 Congo, Democratic Republic of the
2010s 1.6 0-10 1 0-10 0.6 0-10 Congo, Democratic Republic of the

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Congo, Democratic Republic of the or Libya?
Congo, Democratic Republic of the, at 1 0-10 against 1 0-10 in Libya as of 2019.
What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Congo, Democratic Republic of the and Libya?
0 0-10, with Congo, Democratic Republic of the ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for Congo, Democratic Republic of the and Libya?
15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
How do Congo, Democratic Republic of the and Libya rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
Congo, Democratic Republic of the ranks 157th and Libya ranks 157th of 191 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

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Congo, Democratic Republic of the vs Libya: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index. Statizoid. Retrieved 30 August 2026, from https://reference.statizoid.com/compare/protecting-minority-investors-extent-of-director-liability-index-0-10/congo-dem-rep/libya/

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About this data

Indicator
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10)
Unit
0-10
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
191 places, 2,865 data points, 2005–2019
Last refreshed

The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the trans­action upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.