Bolivia, Plurinational State of vs Eswatini: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index

Bolivia, Plurinational State of
5 0-10
in 2019
Eswatini
5 0-10
in 2019
Bolivia, Plurinational State of rank
75th
Eswatini rank
75th

Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index over time

  • Bolivia, Plurinational State of
  • Eswatini
12345200520122019

How they compare

Bolivia, Plurinational State of currently reports 5 0-10 against 5 0-10 in Eswatini, a difference of 0 0-10.

The two have swapped places 1 time across 15 shared years of data; in 2005 it was Bolivia, Plurinational State of ahead.

Bolivia, Plurinational State of ranks 75th and Eswatini ranks 75th of 191 countries.

Bolivia, Plurinational State of has averaged higher in every one of the 2 decades both report.

Head to head by decade

Decade Bolivia, Plurinational State of Eswatini Difference Ahead
2000s 5 0-10 1 0-10 4 0-10 Bolivia, Plurinational State of
2010s 5 0-10 5 0-10 0 0-10

Averages of every year both report within each decade.

Frequently asked questions

Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index, Bolivia, Plurinational State of or Eswatini?
Bolivia, Plurinational State of, at 5 0-10 against 5 0-10 in Eswatini as of 2019.
What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index between Bolivia, Plurinational State of and Eswatini?
0 0-10, with Bolivia, Plurinational State of ahead.
How many years of comparable data are there for Bolivia, Plurinational State of and Eswatini?
15 years are reported by both, from 2005 to 2019.
How do Bolivia, Plurinational State of and Eswatini rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of director liability index?
Bolivia, Plurinational State of ranks 75th and Eswatini ranks 75th of 191 countries.
Where does this data come from?
The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.

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Bolivia, Plurinational State of vs Eswatini: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index. Statizoid. Retrieved 04 September 2026, from https://reference.statizoid.com/compare/protecting-minority-investors-extent-of-director-liability-index-0-10/bolivia/eswatini/

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<a href="https://reference.statizoid.com/compare/protecting-minority-investors-extent-of-director-liability-index-0-10/bolivia/eswatini/">Bolivia, Plurinational State of vs Eswatini: Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index</a> — Statizoid

About this data

Indicator
Protecting minority investors: Extent of director liability index (0-10)
Unit
0-10
Source
World Bank
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (World Bank Open Data)
Coverage
191 places, 2,865 data points, 2005–2019
Last refreshed

The extent of director liability index measures when board members can be held liable for harm caused by related-party transactions and what sanctions are available. It has seven components: (i) whether shareholders can sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (ii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff can hold other executives and directors (the CEO, members of the board of directors or members of the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (iv) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (v) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (vi) whether Mr. James is disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; and (vii) whether a court can void the trans­action upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff.