Oman vs Papua New Guinea: Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index over time
- Oman
- Papua New Guinea
How they compare
Oman currently reports 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Papua New Guinea, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 7 shared years of data; in 2013 it was Oman ahead.
Oman ranks 93rd and Papua New Guinea ranks 93rd of 191 countries.
Oman has averaged higher in every one of the 1 decades both report.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index, Oman or Papua New Guinea?
- Oman, at 3 DB15-20 methodology against 3 DB15-20 methodology in Papua New Guinea as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index between Oman and Papua New Guinea?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Oman ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Oman and Papua New Guinea?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Oman and Papua New Guinea rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index?
- Oman ranks 93rd and Papua New Guinea ranks 93rd of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of corporate transparency index measures the level of information that companies must share regarding their board members, senior executives, annual meetings and audits. This index has seven components: (i) whether Buyer must disclose direct and indirect beneficial ownership stakes representing 5%; (ii) whether Buyer must disclose information about board members’ primary employment and directorships in other companies; (iii) whether Buyer must disclose the compensation of individual managers; (iv) whether a detailed notice of general meeting must be sent 21 calendar days before the meeting; (v) whether shareholders representing 5% of Buyer’s share capital can put items on the general meeting agenda; (vi) whether Buyer’s annual financial statements must be audited by an external auditor; (vii) whether Buyer must disclose its audit reports to the public. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.