Belarus vs United States of America: Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index
Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index over time
- Belarus
- United States of America
How they compare
United States of America currently reports 5.4 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Belarus, a difference of 0.4 DB15-20 methodology.
That makes United States of America's figure about 1.1 times Belarus's.
Across all 7 years both countries report, United States of America has been ahead every year.
Belarus ranks 53rd and United States of America ranks 52nd of 191 countries.
United States of America has averaged higher in every one of the 1 decades both report.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index, Belarus or United States of America?
- United States of America, at 5.4 DB15-20 methodology against 5 DB15-20 methodology in Belarus as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index between Belarus and United States of America?
- 0.4 DB15-20 methodology, with United States of America ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Belarus and United States of America?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Belarus and United States of America rank globally for protecting minority investors: extent of corporate transparency index?
- Belarus ranks 53rd and United States of America ranks 52nd of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Extent of corporate transparency index (0-7) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The extent of corporate transparency index measures the level of information that companies must share regarding their board members, senior executives, annual meetings and audits. This index has seven components: (i) whether Buyer must disclose direct and indirect beneficial ownership stakes representing 5%; (ii) whether Buyer must disclose information about board members’ primary employment and directorships in other companies; (iii) whether Buyer must disclose the compensation of individual managers; (iv) whether a detailed notice of general meeting must be sent 21 calendar days before the meeting; (v) whether shareholders representing 5% of Buyer’s share capital can put items on the general meeting agenda; (vi) whether Buyer’s annual financial statements must be audited by an external auditor; (vii) whether Buyer must disclose its audit reports to the public. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.