Angola vs Cameroon: Protecting minority investors: Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10)
Protecting minority investors: Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) over time
- Angola
- Cameroon
How they compare
Angola currently reports 6 DB15-20 methodology against 6 DB15-20 methodology in Cameroon, a difference of 0 DB15-20 methodology.
The two have swapped places 1 time across 7 shared years of data; in 2013 it was Angola ahead.
Angola ranks 96th and Cameroon ranks 96th of 191 countries.
Angola has averaged higher in every one of the 1 decades both report.
Frequently asked questions
- Which has higher protecting minority investors: ease of shareholder suits index (0-10), Angola or Cameroon?
- Angola, at 6 DB15-20 methodology against 6 DB15-20 methodology in Cameroon as of 2019.
- What is the difference in protecting minority investors: ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) between Angola and Cameroon?
- 0 DB15-20 methodology, with Angola ahead.
- How many years of comparable data are there for Angola and Cameroon?
- 7 years are reported by both, from 2013 to 2019.
- How do Angola and Cameroon rank globally for protecting minority investors: ease of shareholder suits index (0-10)?
- Angola ranks 96th and Cameroon ranks 96th of 191 countries.
- Where does this data come from?
- The World Bank, published as Protecting minority investors: Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) (DB15-20 methodology). Statizoid refreshes it automatically from the source and publishes the full history for both places.
Individual pages
About this data
The ease of shareholder suits index measures how likely plaintiffs are to access internal corporate evidence and recover legal expenses. It has six components: (i) whether shareholders owning 10% of the company’s share capital have the right to inspect the Buyer-Seller transaction documents before filing a suit. Alternatively, whether they can request that a government inspector investigate the Buyer-Seller transaction without filing a suit; (ii) what range of documents is available to the shareholder plaintiff from the defendant and witnesses during trial; (iii) whether the plaintiff can obtain categories of relevant documents from the defendant without identifying each document specifically; (iv) whether the plaintiff can directly examine the defendant and witnesses during trial; (v) whether the standard of proof for civil suits is lower than that for criminal cases; and (vi) whether shareholder plaintiffs can recover their legal expenses from the company. The index is computed based on the methodology in the DB15-20 studies.